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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Neal Moen appeals from the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Moen pied guilty to felony driving under the influence and a habitual 
offender enhancement in exchange for dismissal or reduction of several other 
charges. State v. Moen, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 670, Docket 35907 
(Idaho App., October 15, 2010). The district court imposed a sentence of eight 
years with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction. kl, pp. 1-2. Upon the 
recommendation of the Department of Correction, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction about two months later because Moen "refused to follow rules and 
instructions." kl, p. 2. Moen filed a Rule 35 motion and request for counsel 
asserting, among other things, "that his mental health issues were not addressed 
or taken into consideration during sentencing." kl After determining the motion 
was meritless, the district court denied both the motion and the request for 
counsel. kl The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the 
motion and request for counsel, concluding the Rule 35 motion "failed to assert a 
viable claim of an excessive sentence" and was therefore "frivolous," based on 
the following procedural history: 
At the sentencing hearing, Moen submitted a competency 
evaluation and a substance abuse assessment for the district 
court's consideration. The competency evaluation provided 
diagnoses of adjustment disorder with anxiety and personality 
disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features, and the 
1 
assessment provided that Moen had indications of mental health 
problems. The competency evaluation also explained that Moen 
acts out antisocially and has difficulty coping with the legal system 
when he does not get his way. At the jurisdictional review hearing, 
the district court inquired whether Moen had the resources to obtain 
a psychological evaluation. After Moen's counsel stated that it was 
likely that an evaluation could be accomplished, the district court 
continued the hearing. At the continued hearing, Moen requested 
another continuance so that he could complete a psychological 
evaluation, which the district court granted. However, when the 
hearing was finally held, Moen proceeded despite the fact that no 
evaluation had been accomplished. 
pp. 2-3 (footnote omitted). 
Moen filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting violations of his 
rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by both the district 
court and his trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate 
counsel. (R, pp. 7-13, 36-43, 52-66, 118-32.) His requested relief was a 
reduction of his sentence to a four-year fixed term. (R., p. 9.) The state 
answered (R, pp. 115-16) and moved to dismiss (Augmentation, pp. 112-13). 
The district court also provided notice of intent to dismiss. (Augmentation, pp. 
126-29.) The district court thereafter dismissed. (R, p. 181.) Moen filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 183-87.) 
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ISSUES 
Moen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Moen's 
claims because he presented issues of fact that entitled him 
to post-conviction relief? 
2. Did the district court violate Mr. Moen's right to due process 
and abuse its discretion by denying him of [sic] a meaningful 
opportunity to present his post-conviction claims, [by] 
allowing counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint 
replacement counsel? 
3. Did the district court violate Mr. Moen's right to due process 
in dismissing several of his post-conviction claims sua 
sponte and without prior notice? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 30.) The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The district court granted Moen two extensions to secure and present 
additional psychological evidence for sentencing, yet ultimately Moen did 
not present such evidence. Is Moen's claim that he did not have the 
opportunity to present favorable evidence frivolous? 
2. Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in relation to his guilty plea? 
3. Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to sentencing and 
relinquishment of jurisdiction proceedings? 
4. Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that 
the district court violated the plea agreement? 
5. Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that 
the district court was not an impartial tribunal? 
6. Is Moen's claim that the district court erred by not overruling precedent of 
the Supreme Court of the United States frivolous? 
7. Has Moen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by not 
appointing new counsel after Moen's post-conviction counsel withdrew 
from the case? 
8. Has Moen failed to show he was provided inadequate notice? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moen's Claims That The District Court Violated His Due Process Right To 
Present Psychological Evidence At Sentencing Is Frivolous 
A. Introduction 
Moen alleged the district court violated his rights by proceeding to 
sentencing without a "proper" psychological evaluation. (R., p. 23.) He asserts 
on appeal that this allegation established a prima facie claim that the district court 
violated his due process rights at sentencing and in relinquishing jurisdiction by 
not ordering a psychological evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522, and therefore erred 
in summarily dismissing this claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-42.) Moen's 
argument is frivolous because due process only requires the opportunity to 
present evidence, and therefore did not require the trial court to order Moen to 
obtain a psychological evaluation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
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C. Moen's Claim Of A Due Process Violation Is Frivolous Because Due 
Process Requires Only The Opportunity To Present Evidence 
"The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process 
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." State v. 
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010). Due process is 
afforded if the person whose liberty or property interest is at stake is afforded 
"meaningful notice and opportunity to present evidence that is relevant" to the 
proceeding. & Three safeguards are required to assure due process in 
sentencing: (1) an opportunity to present favorable evidence; (2) an opportunity 
to examine all materials "contained in the presentence report"; and (3) an 
opportunity to explain or rebut adverse evidence. State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 
174-75, 90 P.3d 920, 924-25 (Ct. App. 2004). In the criminal case Moen was 
given the opportunity to examine and respond to the psychological evidence 
presented at sentencing and to provide additional psychological evidence. 
Moen, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 670, at pp. 2-3. (See also #35907 9/11/08 
Tr., p. 47, L. 5- p. 48, L. 15 (court asking ifthere are more evaluations needed)). 
The district court very clearly did not deny Moen a meaningful opportunity 
to present favorable evidence. Moen's argument that the district court had to 
order Moen to secure favorable evidence, in the form of a psychological 
evaluation, in order to give him a meaningful opportunity to be heard (Appellant's 
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brief, pp. 31-421) is frivolous. Moen has failed to show error in the summary 
dismissal of his claim that the district court violated due process rights. 
11. 
The District Court Properly Dismissed Moen's Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel In Relation To The Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
As part of a plea agreement that resolved three felony cases, Moen pied 
guilty to a charge of battery, reduced from domestic battery, and received a 
sentence of credit for time served. (#35907 9/11/08 Tr., p. 4, L. 10 p. 19, L. 21; 
p. 24, L. 2- p. 25, L. 6; p. 81, Ls. 7-10; #35907 R., pp. 40-41.) In post-conviction 
Moen asserted his trial counsel coerced his guilty plea to a reduced charge of 
battery despite his claims of innocence. (R., p. 26.) The district court provided 
notice that it intended to dismiss the petition for lack of supporting evidence 
(Augmentation, pp. 127-28) and dismissed the petition (R., p. 181). Moen 
asserts the district court erred (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-46), but fails to cite any 
evidence in the record supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1 Moen asserts that I. C. § 19-2522 "implement[s]" due process safeguards, and 
therefore failure to sua sponte order an evaluation violated due process. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 31.) The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected this argument. 
State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 311 P.3d 283, 285 (2013) (claimed violation of 
I.C. § 19-2522 not reviewable as fundamental error because "failure to sua 
sponte order the evaluation did not violate a constitutional right"). Moen also 
asserts the district court violated due process by not ordering a psychological 
evaluation prior to relinquishing jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-42.) Again, 
this argument is directly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. State v. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293, 298 (2001) (dua process does not 
apply to relinquishment of jurisdiction as no liberty interest is at stake). Neither of 
these controlling precedents is cited in the Appellant's brief. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Moen Presented No Evidence Supporting His Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel 
A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this 
deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 
424 (1989)). To establish deficient performance the petitioner must overcome a 
strong presumption that counsel performed within the wide range of professional 
assistance by proving trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382, 247 P.3d 582, 609 
(201 O); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. 
State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To meet this 
7 
burden "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 
prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. 
State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a 
guilty plea, "[i]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to 
obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a 
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
Trial counsel negotiated a plea agreement regarding three felony charges 
whereby Moen pied guilty to one felony (DUI), the state dismissed a second 
felony (intimidating a witness), and the third (domestic battery) was reduced to a 
misdemeanor so that no additional time would have to be served. There is no 
evidence in the record supporting a claim that counsel in any way performed 
deficiently and, far from alleging he would have rejected the plea agreement and 
gone to trial, Moen's only requested remedy was a reduction in his felony DUI 
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sentence. On appeal Moen asserts his guilty plea was involuntary, but fails to 
cite any evidence that any alleged defects in the plea agreement were fault of 
counsel and does not even address the relevant prejudice question of whether 
Moen would have reasonably rejected the plea agreement and demanded a trial 
on the three felonies. (Appellant's brief, pp. 42-46.) Because Moen failed to 
present any evidence of deficient performance and did not even allege prejudice, 
dismissal was proper. 
111. 
Moen Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of Claims Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel At Sentencing And Relinquishment Of Jurisdiction 
Proceedings 
A. Introduction 
Moen asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a 
psychological evaluation for both the sentencing and the hearing on 
relinquishment of jurisdiction. (R., pp. 54-59.) On appeal he asserts that it is 
enough for him to have demonstrated the possibility of a mental illness to get a 
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in not securing an 
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 46-52.) That Moen may have had a mental 
illness is not, standing alone, evidence that his counsel was deficient for not 
obtaining or presenting a psychological evaluation, much less evidence of 
prejudice. The district court therefore properly dismissed this claim as 
unsupported by evidence sufficient to raise a prima facie claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
9 
Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal a post-conviction petition, 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
C. Moen Failed To Present Evidence Tending To Show Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel In Sentencing Or The Jurisdictional Review 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must demonstrate 
both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiency 
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
Strategic choices of counsel are reviewed deferentially, and if "made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable." & at 690. "The duty to investigate requires only that counsel 
conduct a reasonable investigation." Steven v. State,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d 
2013 WL 6423426 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
280, 971 P.2d 727, 733 (1998)). Decisions to follow a particular trial or 
sentencing strategy that make "particular investigations unnecessary" are entitled 
to "a heavy measure of deference." Cullen v. Pinholster, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct 
1388 (2011) (citing Strickland). That an attorney could have presented "more 
evidence" or even "more persuasive evidence" "does not mean" counsel has 
been ineffective. State v. Pavne, 146 Idaho 548, 578, 199 P.3d 123, 153 (2008). 
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In the criminal case trial counsel elected to pursue a strategy based more 
on evaluations related to alcohol abuse and rehabilitation than on mental 
issues. (See #359079/11/08 Tr., p. 47, L. 5 - p. 48, L. 15 (counsel stating intent 
to proceed to sentencing with substance abuse evaluation and not mental health 
evaluation).) Such was a reasonable strategy in a DUI sentencing. That strategy 
reinforced by evidence suggesting that Moen suffered from untreatable 
adjustment or 'Jnality disorders rather than treatable mental illnesses. (R., 
pp. 86-89.) Moen presc,, tactical decision to pursue a 
sentencing strategy of addressing his addictions rather than his personality 
disorders was unreasonable or that he suffered any prejudice. 
Moen did submit two pieces of evidence he believed supported his claim. 
First, Moen provided a document purporting to be a letter indicating his girlfriend, 
on February 4, 2009, made an appointment for a psychological evaluation on 
March 2, 2009. (R., p. 15.) Because these events were after sentencing, this 
evidence is not relevant to any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing. Nor does the evidence support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in relation to the jurisdictional review hearing2 because, at best, the 
timing of events indicates any failure to obtain an evaluation was not the fault of 
counseL 
The first jurisdictional review hearing was scheduled for January 9, 2009, 
and set over until January 14, 2009. (#35907 R., pp. 62-63.) The court 
2 Moen has failed to establish that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel even 
applies at a jurisdictional review hearing. The state will assume, for purposes of 
this brief, that there is a statutory right imposing similar standards of competence. 
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continued the hearing a second time, until January 26, 2009. (#35907 R., pp. 69-
73.) The hearing was then again continued until February 18, 2009. (#35907 R., 
pp. 74-75.) The hearing was eventually held on February 23, 2009. (#35907 
Supp. Tr.) The letter thus indicates that Moen waited until February 4, 2009-
after the hearing had been continued three times-to make an appointment for 
an evaluation. The appointment for the evaluation was, in turn, scheduled for a 
date weeks after the date for the hearing. This is not evidence that counsel 
performed deficiently in scheduling an evaluation. 
The other evidence Moen submitted is a single page of a purported 2009 
psychological evaluation. (R., pp. 56-57, 111.) Moen did not provide the 
remainder of the evaluation, including evidence of whether the evaluation 
preceded or followed the hearing on retained jurisdiction. The single page of the 
evaluation he produced contained diagnoses of "numerous psychiatric issues 
that were quite severe in nature, and could lead to an increased risk to reoffend." 
(R., p. 111.) Moen's "mood and personality disorders" made him "very impulsive 
and aggressive" and created the "possibility of intense violence." (R., p. 111.) 
Neither deficient performance nor prejud is suggested by this evidence. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that counsel would not have done Moen any 
favors by making sure this evaluation was before the sentencing court. 
Moen has failed to show any deficient performance in counsel's tactical 
election to focus on alcohol abuse instead of mental illness for purposes of 
sentencing. Moreover, his evidence has affirmatively shown a lack of prejudice 
by demonstrating that a psychological evaluation would have been far more 
12 
damning than helpful in sentencing. Moen failed to present admissible evidence 
demonstrating a prima facie claim of either prong of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
IV. 
Moen's Assertion That The District Court Violated The Plea Agreement Is 
Frivolous 
A Introduction 
Moen alleged the trial court committed "judicial misconduct" by failing to 
make an "appropriate recommendation" to the Department of Correction and 
adding to the terms of the plea agreement when it recommended "level A" 
therapy during the retained jurisdiction program (R., p. 8, 23-34.) On appeal 
Moen asserts this constituted a viable post-conviction claim of a due process 
violation by the district court. (Appellant's brief, pp. 52-55.) Review of the 
relevant law shows this assertion to be frivolous. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
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Moen's Claim That The District Court Violated His Due Process Rights By 
Recommending A Programming Level Is Frivolous 
Moen argues that the district court's recommendation to the Department of 
Correction that Moen complete level A programming on his rider violated his due 
process rights in two ways: by rendering his guilty plea involuntary and by 
imposing an impossible condition of probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 52-55.) 
This argument is directly contrary to well established and basic principles of due 
process law, and is therefore frivolous. 
Moen's contention that the district court's actions at sentencing rendered 
the plea invalid was "repudiated" by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
2009. McAmis v. State, Idaho_, 317 P.3d 49, 50-51 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)). Taking Moen's guilty 
plea certainly did not breach any plea agreement, and no part of the sentence is 
in any way inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. Even if there were 
evidence the trial court had taken some action inconsistent with the plea 
agreement at sentencing, Moen's claim that such rendered invalid his previously 
entered plea is without legal merit. 
Moen's claim that the district court violated his due process rights by 
imposing a term of probation that was impossible to fulfill when it recommended 
level A programming during the retained jurisdiction program is equally frivolous. 
First, Moen was not put on probation. Although due process applies before the 
liberty interest held by a probationer may be taken by the government, State v. 
Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 871, 292 P.3d 258, 262 (2012), an inmate on retained 
jurisdiction has no "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in the hope of a 
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future probation, and therefore no right to additional process, State v. Coassolo, 
136 Idaho 138, 142-43, 30 P.3d 293, 297-98 (2001). 3 Moen's assertion that due 
process forbad the trial court's recommendation for programming in relation to 
his retained jurisdiction is devoid of legal or factual support, and is therefore 
frivolous. 
V. 
Moen Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim The 
Court Was Not An Impartial Tribunal 
A Introduction 
Moen alleged that in the criminal proceedings the court engaged in 
"judicial misconduct" such as going "outside the bounds" of the plea agreement, 
recommending "Level A" on his rider even though Moen was incapable of 
succeeding at that level, coercing his guilty plea, and "mishandling" letters 
between him and his attorney. (R., pp. 8, 24.) Moen later moved to amend his 
petition to allege the trial judge had "contacted the Department of Corrections 
[sic]" and "sabotaged Petitioner's program." (Augmentation, pp. 43, 76.) He also 
sought to include allegations that the number of appeals of rulings by the district 
judge was evidence of his corruption, but that the district judge is affirmed 
3 Although Moen has cited cases for the proposition that a condition of probation 
impossible of fulfillment is improper because it does not serve rehabilitation, he 
has cited no cases indicating such a rule is of constitutional origin. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 54.) Because the primary purpose of retained jurisdiction is to determine 
the defendant's suitability for probation, learning that a defendant cannot qualify 
for or complete necessary programming during the retained jurisdiction period is 
a good way to avoid impossible conditions of probation later. 
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because the Idaho Court of Appeals is "just as corrupt because they are cronys 
[sic]." (Id.) The district court denied Moen's attempts amend his petition. 
(Augmentation, p. 100.) The district court ultimately concluded Moen's claims in 
his petition were "unsubstantiated conclusory allegations" and he had failed to 
present "evidence sufficient to support any grounds upon which relief can be 
granted." (Augmentation, p. 128.) 
On appeal Moen asserts he stated a viable claim that the judge in his 
criminal case was biased and therefore violated his right to a fair tribunal. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 55-57.) Specifically, Moen asserts on appeal that the 
"district court communicated with the counselor outside Mr. Moen's presence, 
failed to address the attorney letters in the court file, failed to protect Mr. Moen's 
health by ensuring adequate mental health treatment and otherwise failed to act 
impartially." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) Even a cursory review of this argument 
shows it is frivolous. 
Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct App. 1986). 
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C. Moen's Appellate Arguments That He Presented Evidence Of A Prima 
Facie Claim That The Court Was Biased And Thus An Unfair Tribunal Are 
Specious 
"It is axiomatic that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process." State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, _, 314 P.3d 136, 140 (2013) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). There are three circumstances 
indicating bias that are impermissible under the Due Process Clause: "(1) 
instances where the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case; (2) 
the situation where a judge charges a defendant with criminal contempt and then 
proceeds to try him on the charge; and (3) cases where a person with a personal 
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing the judge on the case." bi at_, 314 P.3d at 141 (internal citations 
omitted). A judge need not disqualify himself if he "can make the proper legal 
analysis" and the appellate court "presume[s] that a sentencing judge is able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of a broad range of information which may 
be presented during the sentencing process, and to disregard that which is 
irrelevant and unreliable." bi (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
"Furthermore, a trial judge's exposure to evidence, admissible or not, standing 
alone, does not demonstrate bias at sentencing." bi 
During the hearing on retained jurisdiction Moen claimed that his 
counselor had told him that she had talked with the judge and told him "the judge 
had nothing good to say about [Moen]." (#35907 Supp. , p. 56, L. 3 - p. 57, L. 
16.) The counselor confirmed having a phone conversation with the judge. (Id. 
at p. 83, L. 9 - p. 84, L. 10.) She testified that the judge informed her that Moen 
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would not be relinquished merely because the Department of Correction not 
placed him in A programming. (Id. p. 85, L. 22 - p. 89, L. 15.) The court 
made explicit findings of fact regarding that conversation, including that he made 
the call in response to a letter from Moen's counsel to the IDOC counselor, which 
was copied to the court, and that he took an accurate note of the conversation 
and provided this note to both counsel prior to the relinquishment hearing. (Id. at 
p. 115, L. 19 - p. 116, L. 6; Augmentation, p. 298.) Although a call directly to the 
counselor by the judge was not the best practice, the record shows the judge 
was merely trying to clarify his order once questions about the significance of his 
recommendation for placement in level A programming had been raised by 
Moen. The judge was trying to give Moen the best chance of succeeding on the 
rider; Moen's claims the judge was casting aspersions or deliberately 
undermining his chances of success are both devoid of admissible evidence and 
affirmatively disproved by the record. Likewise, Moen's appellate claim that the 
counselor conveyed information that influenced the judge at the relinquishment 
hearing (Appellant's brief, pp. 56-57) was never pied below, lacks support by any 
admissible evidence, and is disproved by the record. Clearly Moen had a full and 
fair opportunity to explore the telephone conversation at the relinquishment 
hearing, in fact did so, and facts disproving his current claim were established in 
the record. 
Moen next claims the court "failed to address the attorney letters in the 
court file." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) This claim is directly contrary to the record. 
At the relinquishment hearing the matter was raised and fully addressed. 
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(#35907 Supp. Tr., p. 109, L. 11 - p. 113, 3.) The court informed Moen it had 
not read the letters and offered to return them unread. (Id. at p. 112, 10 - p. 
113, L. 3.) Moen's arguments-that "the existence of privileged communications 
in the court file certainly raises the appearance of impropriety"; that the court 
failed to reprimand the jail; and that the court was obviously unprepared for the 
hearing because it had not read the fetters (Appellant's brief p. 57 (including note 
6))-are wholly irrelevant to any claim the court was biased. There is no 
evidence the judge sought out or personally obtained the letters (the evidence is 
exactly to the contrary) so there is no evidence that the judge was involved in any 
impropriety that might have existed. Likewise, what actions the court did or did 
not take to address any alleged violation of the attorney client privilege by third 
parties has no relevance to a claim he was biased against Moen. Again, Moen's 
appellate assertions are frivolous. 
Finally, Moen asserts the court failed to "ensur[e]" he had "adequate 
mental health treatment." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) The judge did not decide 
what mental health treatment Moen received while incarcerated, the Department 
of Correction did. This claim is specious. 
To show that the court was not acting as the constitutional tribunal 
required by due process is a high bar. Moen's claims did not get close enough to 
that bar to even go under it. 
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VI. 
Moen's Claim He ls Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On Whether He Was 
Entitled To A Grand Jury Indictment Is Frivolous 
Moen argues the court erred by not letting him pursue to an evidentiary 
hearing his claim that he was entitled to by an indictment returned by a grand jury 
(as opposed to an information filed after a preliminary hearing). (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 58-60.) Moen did not have a federal constitutional right to a grand jury 
indictment in a state court criminal proceeding. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516 (1884). Moen has failed to show the district court erred by failing to overrule 
the Supreme Court of the United States.4 Moen's appellate argument is 
frivolous. 
VII. 
Moen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Granting Post-
Conviction Counsel's Motion To Withdraw 
A. Introduction 
The district court appointed counsel to represent Moen in this post-
conviction action. (Augmentation, pp. 2, 5, 16-17.) Moen moved to appoint 
himself co-counsel because counsel was "unwilling to file motions [his] 
request." (Augmentation, pp. 33-35.) He filed a "Motion for Intervention 
4 The general rule is that decisions announcing new rules are to be applied "to all 
criminal cases still pending on direct review" and are applied retroactively (to 
collateral attacks on final judgments) only in limited circumstances. Rhoades v. 
State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010). See also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 
U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("new rule" applies to cases on direct review but generally 
not retroactively to collateral attacks on final judgments). Thus, even if the 
Supreme Court of the United States chooses to overrule Hurtado at some point 
Moen would not be able to use such overruling to collaterally attack his 
conviction in this post-conviction action. 
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Between Attorney/Client" asserting his counsel was "do[ing] absolutely nothing in 
case," "tried to discourage [him] from presenting key issues," "refus[ed] file 
motions," "has sided with the prosecution and is sabotaging this case," and that 
refusing to remove his current counsel would be "an act of communism and 
treason." (Augmentation, pp. 49-51.) A few months later substitute counsel 
appeared for Moen. (Augmentation, pp. 114-15.) Substiutute counsel later 
moved to withdraw for lack of cooperation of his client. (Augmentation, pp. 116-
17; Tr., p. 6, L. 25 p. 11, L. 24.) The district court granted counsel's motion to 
withdraw, and determined that new counsel should not be appointed because the 
allegations in the supplemental petition were "unsupported by any evidence" and 
that the facts alleged did not "raise the possibility of a valid claim." (Tr., p. 14, L. 
4 - p. 15, L. 4; Augmentation, p. 130.) Shortly thereafter the district court 
dismissed the petition. (R., p. 181.) 
Moen claims the district court violated his due process rights by not 
appointing new counsel to represent him when his appointed counsel withdrew. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 60-76.) Because Moen had failed to raise the possibility of 
a valid claim, however, he has failed to show any error in the district court's 
exercise of discretion in declining to appoint counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Denial of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004). "In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post 
conviction proceedings, '[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of 
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fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of this Court 
free review."' Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P .3d 1111 
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 )). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Concluding That 
Appointment Of New Counsel Was Not Called For Because Even With 
The Assistance Of Counsel Moen Had Failed To Allege Non-Frivolous 
Claims 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to 
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
655, 152 P .3d 12, 16 (2007), see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). "Facts sufficient to state a claim may not be 
alleged because they do not exist or because the pro se applicant does not know 
the essential elements of a claim." Gonzalez v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 
P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 
1112). Review of the record supports the district court's conclusion that there 
was no factual basis for Moen's claims. 
First, Moen had the benefit of two different attorneys for over 18 months. 
(Augmentation pp. 2 (April 29, 2011 appointment of counsel), 114-15 
(substitution of counsel), 130 (November 16, 2012 order permitting withdrawal of 
counsel).) Counsel filed a supplemental petition on Moen's behalf. (R., pp. 118-
.) Moen cannot claim that any lack of factual development of his pleadings 
was because of lack of counsel. Moen's inability to formulate a viable claim 
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post-conviction relief even with the assistance of counsel demonstrates that the 
court properly exercised its discretion because is no reason to 
believe that any deficiencies in the pleadings were because of Moen's ignorance, 
as opposed to lack of merit. 
Second, as articulated above, Moen's claims for relief range from 
meritless to frivolous. Moen asserts other "claims" are possibly valid (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 69-76 (asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; 
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to 
suppress; that the DUI statute is unconstitutional or invalid; his DUI was not a 
felony; disparate sentencing and cruel and unusual punishment; and an 
argument that multiple frivolous claims may be aggregated to show the possibility 
of a valid claim), but cites to nowhere in the record that these "claims" were 
raised in pleadings, much less demonstrates that they were presented in verified 
form with supporting evidence.5 On its face Moen's argument that the court 
should have appointed counsel to pursue claims that prior counsel did not elect 
to pursue and were never raised in actual pleadings or supported by any 
evidence or law is frivolous. 
Finally, Moen asserts that he is entitled to such procedures as a contested 
hearing on whether he is entitled to counsel and requiring the district court to 
5 As set forth in more detail below, it would have been error for the district court to 
address these claims, which were not raised as causes of action in actual 
pleadings, in summary dismissal proceedings. See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 
517, 523-24, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283-84 (2010). Moen's belief that new counsel 
would have successfully amended the pleading to include these claims is 
unjustified on the record. 
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address his concerns about previous counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 62-68.) A 
petitioner's right to counsel in proceedings is statute. See 
Hall v. State, 1 Idaho 610, _, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013). The Applicable 
statute, I.C. § 19-4904, does not grant these rights claimed by Moen. The 
applicable standard, set forth in more detail above, is whether the district court 
correctly determined that Moen had failed to set forth the possibility of a valid 
claim. Because there is no reason to believe that any of the claims asserted by 
Moen are valid or could be rendered valid by additional assistance of counsel, 
the district court did not err by denying appointment of new counsel after 
appointed counsel withdrew. 
VIII. 
Moen Had More Than Adeauate Notice Prior To Dismissal Of His Petition 
A. Introduction 
Moen asserts he had inadequate notice because the state's motion to 
dismiss and the district court's notice of intent to dismiss failed to address "the 
claims Mr. Moen raised pro se." (Appellant's brief, p. 78.) Specifically, Moen 
claims the court was required to "address the later submissions ... which were 
filed after the district court deprived [sic] Mr. Moen of counsel." (Id.) The record 
shows the district court provided its notice of intent to dismiss at the same time it 
denied appointment of new counsel. (Augmentation, pp. 126, 130.) Moen's 
argument that the court was supposed to anticipate his response to the notice of 
intent to dismiss and preemptively address that response is frivolous. 
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Moen Has Failed To Show That He Was Denied Notice 
Although a post-conviction petitioner may not challenge adequacy of 
notice for the first time on appeal, he may challenge the absence of notice. Kelly 
v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521-22, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281-82 (2010). Where the 
motion seeks summary dismissal of all claims for lack of evidentiary support and 
there was no request for clarification, the motion or notice of intent to dismiss 
cannot be challenged on appeal "irrespective of whether that notice was 
sufficient." kl at 522-23, 236 P.3d at 1282-83. 
The state moved for dismissal of all claims on the basis that they were 
supported only by "conclusory allegations unsupported by factual evidence." 
(Augmentation, pp. 112-13.) The district court addressed the claims in the 
petition and supplemental petition in more detail, finding both factual and legal 
deficiencies in the claims. (Augmentation, pp. 126-29.) Moen was provided 
notice that the claims he had asserted in his pleadings were subject to summary 
dismissal because they were unsupported by admissible evidence, were legally 
deficient, or both, and therefore there is no error shown on appeal with the 
dismissal of the petition and supplemental petition. 
C. The Court Did Not Have To Provide Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Causes 
Of Action Never Raised In The Pleadings 
Moen also contends he raised several causes of action in his "pro se 
submissions" that were unaddressed in the state's motion and court's notice. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 76-78.) Moen cites no law that causes of action raised 
outside of a petition must be addressed in a motion to dismiss that petition. (Id.) 
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The law is to contrary: "It is clearly under Idaho law that a cause 
action not raised party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Kelly, 149 Idaho 
at 523-24, 236 P .3d at 1283-84. Thus, under "clearly established Idaho law" 
completely ignored by Moen, not only was it not error for the court to not consider 
Moen's attempts to raise new claims, it would have been error for it to do so. !s;L 
Moen, far from showing error, is actively encouraging it. His appellate claim of 
lack of notice prior to dismissal of causes of action asserted outside the 
pleadings must be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Moen's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 25th day of February ( 
"=~~,;::_---=~~ 
K 
Deputy Attorney GeAeral 
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